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Abstract 
We use a comprehensive sample of takeovers in Belgium to show that 
they are remarkably common and an important part of many firms’ growth 
process.  They affect both small and large firms and, over a five-year 
period, 17 percent of private employment.  We estimate the impact of 
takeovers on employment growth of the merged entity using an empirical 
framework that explicitly takes into account that mergers are formed by 
pairs of firms.  It allows for post-merger employment outcomes that are 
heterogeneous and determined jointly by the characteristics of both 
partners.  The average merger is estimated to reduce employment by 8% 
over a four-year period, but the contraction can be three times as large for 
some types of mergers, while employment expands for other types. 
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1. Introduction 
A large literature has studied the effect of mergers and acquisitions on employment, especially 
in the context of foreign takeovers, but little consensus has emerged regarding their effects.1  
While studies that find a negative effect on employment in takeover targets outnumber those 
that find evidence of employment expansions, effects in acquiring firms could compensate for 
this, but estimates for them are equally ambiguous.2   
Three studies have looked at the evolution of total employment for the merged entities, but 
estimates are again inconclusive.  On a sample of all mergers involving workers covered by 
the Michigan unemployment insurance system between 1978 and 1984, Brown and Medoff 
(1988) find that mergers lead to employment expansions, at least when the firms integrate their 
workforces.  In contrast, on a sample of 442 domestic mergers initiated by large UK firms over 
a 30-year period, Conyon et al. (2002) document a sharply reduced demand for labor, even 
controlling for output changes.  Finally, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) study only mergers that 
involve a listed acquirer and find negative employment effects for European, but not for US 
firms.   
These employment effects are potentially important, as we show that takeover activity is a 
more dynamic and frequent process than often portrayed, affecting both small and large firms.  
On our comprehensive sample of takeovers in the Belgian domestic market, we count 2,601 
mergers over a seven-year period, involving 6,000 firms as acquirer or target.3  Aggregate 
effects could be important as these firms tend to be larger than average.  We calculate that in 
an average five-year period 17 percent of private sector employees work for a firm that is 
                                                 
1 Girma and Görg (2004), for example, show that foreign takeovers reduce employment growth of domestic plants 
in the UK electronics sector, but not in the food sector; just as Lehto and Böckerman (2008) find negative 
employment effects for Finnish manufacturing plants, but not in services.  Bandick and Görg (2010) even find 
some evidence of an employment expansion in Swedish targets, but only for exporters in vertical takeovers, while 
McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) find positive effects more generally for US manufacturing, except in the case of 
the largest plants, not distinguishing between foreign and domestic takeovers.   
2 Stiebale and Trax (2011) find no significant effects on the domestic employment of French or UK acquirers, 
while Furlan (2015) finds a positive effect in a sample of European takeovers.   
3 The distinction between mergers and takeovers or acquisitions is essentially a legal one without a clear-cut 
difference in an economic sense.  Similar to previous work, we do not discern between them and use the terms 
interchangeably.   
  
 
3 
 
 
involved in a takeover.  If takeovers would systematically increase or reduce firms’ demand 
for labor, the impact on the labor market would be considerable.   
To identify the employment effect of mergers, we need to take a stand on the following three 
questions: (1) How can we identify a merger? (2) What is a proper control for a newly created 
firm? (3) Why did the firms merge?  These questions lead to important measurement issues 
that help explain the wide range of estimates obtained in the literature.  We make contributions 
dealing with each of these three measurement challenges.   
First, one reason for conflicting results is that the sample of mergers differs greatly across 
studies.  Some only look at a relatively small number of mergers by large, often listed firms, 
while others use innovative methods or unique data to obtain a record of “all” mergers in a 
target population, in the latter group are Brown and Medoff (1988), Lehto and Böckerman 
(2008), and Burghardt and Helm (2015).  Our objective is to identify the universe of firm-level 
reorganizations that are an integral part of firms’ growth process.  We complement filings at 
the Commercial Court with instances where we observe in the Belgian social security records 
that workforces of two firms are combined or that a substantial fraction of the workforce moves 
from one firm to another (Geurts, 2016).4  We do not include strategic mergers, often motivated 
by firm diversification or market power, where the original firms continue to operate 
independently.  We believe the process of firm integration is an important and understudied 
way that growth takes place in the economy.  In the process of constructing a control sample 
of potential mergers, we document new insights about “who merges with whom.”   
Second, previous studies have traced the employment evolution of targets, acquirers, or the 
total for the merged firms.  The latter is preferable in our setting as employment effects are 
likely to be asymmetric for targets and acquirers, and can even offset if jobs are reallocated 
between the two merging entities.  To deal with endogeneity, most recent studies rely on the 
selection-on-observables assumption and use a matching estimator comparing the employment 
evolution of merging firms to a counterfactual evolution (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).5  
Existing studies use single firms that are comparable in characteristics to one of the merging 
                                                 
4 This data constitutes the universe of the employer-employee records for the private sector in Belgium.   
5
 Even though endogeneity of mergers is clearly important, it is sometimes ignored because it has proven virtually 
impossible to find good instruments.  Any variable correlated with a firm’s decision to engage in a merger is likely 
to be correlated with post-merger firm performance.   
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firms as counterfactual.  Mergers, however, are formed by pairs of firms with different 
characteristics, making single firms inappropriate counterfactuals.  Instead, we use as control 
group simulated pairs of non-merging firms that match a set of pre-merger characteristics of 
both the target and the acquirer.  This way we obtain a comparable post-merger employment 
outcome in the case the two firms would not have merged.  This ‘dyadic’ approach has been 
used in the strategic alliance literature where alliance formation is explicitly modelled as 
determined jointly by both partners’ preferences and characteristics (Chung, Singh and Lee, 
2000).  It specifically takes into account that the characteristics of both the target and the 
acquirer affect the decision to engage in a takeover and we can even let the post-merger growth 
patterns depend on these combined features.       
Third, the literature discusses a variety of motivations for mergers with potentially different 
effects on employment.6  Two employment-reducing effects have featured prominently: (i) 
increased market power is likely to reduce output and thus employment, and (ii) a new 
management team is less likely to be committed to upholding past contracts with stakeholders 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988).  In contrast, Röller et al. (2001) discuss how different types of 
efficiency gains can have negative or positive effects on employment.7  Kalnins et al. (2017) 
show that hotel mergers raise capacity utilization (occupancy) and have the potential to boost 
employment.  Merely including control variables in the regression that describes the 
employment effect of a representative merger fails to capture this richness.  Our control group 
of simulated firm pairs does not constrain us to estimate a single effect, but allows flexibly for 
heterogeneous effects of mergers depending on the circumstances.  We use detailed target firm 
and acquirer characteristics as well as their interactions to identify an appropriate control group, 
as well as to allow the employment effect of a merger vary along those dimensions.8 
                                                 
6 Motivations for mergers discussed in the literature include saving on labor costs, realizing synergies, improving 
management and control,  increasing market power, or benefitting from tax incentives. Non-profit maximizing 
motives, such as spending free cash flow, might also play a role (Jarrell et al. 1988; Jensen 1988). 
7 Eliminating duplication in headquarter services will reduce employment, but a merger that raises labor 
productivity will increase output and employment if the demand elasticity is sufficiently high.  Lower capital costs 
for small firms or higher bargaining power to negotiate down prices of intermediate inputs are two other 
mechanisms that can raise employment.   
8  These include the detailed industry affiliation of both firms, their size and pre-merger growth performance, and 
their corporate structure. 
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Beyond the methodological innovations, we also report a number of novel economic 
findings.  First, mergers that lead to workforce integration are a lot more common than one 
might expect, affecting on average 0.74% of firms and 4.29% of workers each year.  More than 
one third of these events are not detected from filings at the Commercial Court, but show up in 
the employee-flows.  Second, the average merger reduces employment by 2.33% in merging 
firms compared to an observationally equivalent pair of non-merging firms.  These 
employment losses accumulate to 8.28% from the year before to three years after the merger.  
Third, we find evidence of substantial heterogeneity.  The average employment outcome over 
the 71 sub-groups where we have enough observations to estimate a separate takeover effect 
ranges from -18% to +6%.  Fourth, to understand mergers with unusual employment effects it 
is important to consider the characteristics of targets and acquirers jointly.  For example, we 
find that a takeover of a target firm with above-average growth for its industry by an acquirer 
from a declining industry that is part of an enterprise group leads to an employment expansion 
for the newly created firm.  However, takeovers of targets with below-average growth or by 
acquirers from a growing industry show employment effects that do not differ from the average.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we outline our estimation 
framework and in Section 3 we introduce the data.  In Section 4 we describe how we identify 
mergers and how we construct an appropriate control group;  we also document the 
characteristics of merging firms.  In Section 5 we show employment effects of mergers, first 
the average effect, and then the effects by type of mergers.  Section 6 concludes.   
2. Estimation framework 
To evaluate the impact of takeovers on post-merger employment, we combine elements from 
three separate strands in the literature.  First, we use as dependent variable the sum of 
employment of the two firms entering a merger rather than looking only at target firms or 
acquirers.  Second, we use the sum of employment for simulated pairs of firms with similar 
characteristics as the merging firms as counterfactual in the comparison rather than comparing 
with the employment evolution of individual firms.  Third, we use a treatment effects estimator 
that exactly matches on discrete covariates of both the target firm and acquirer to find 
comparable pairs of firms rather than using the propensity score.  We now describe these three 
modeling choices in greater detail and highlight their advantages.   
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2.1. Dependent variable: total employment 
Most previous studies restrict their analysis only to post-merger outcomes for the target plants 
or firms.  This is a natural choice if one is interested in studying the effects of acquisitions of 
domestic plants by foreign multinationals, but it is ill-suited for our interest in the role of 
domestic takeovers or mergers in the firm growth process.  Takeovers may very well affect 
employment of the acquiring firm, as it is common for jobs or entire departments to be 
reorganized or reallocated across the merged entities (Furlan, 2015).  Merely taking into 
account the jobs that are lost (or gained) in the target firm, may under or overestimate the 
overall employment impact.   
A straightforward solution by Brown and Medoff (1988) and Conyon et al. (2002) is to 
estimate the employment impact at the level of the combined entity, i.e. on total employment 
at the target and acquirer firms combined.  Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) follow the same 
approach and additionally take into account that firms often undertake multiple mergers or 
divestitures and they incorporate information on the entire merger history of firms.   
In each of these three studies, the other observations included in the regression, and thus the 
implicit comparison group, are all the non-merging firms from the respective datasets, or in the 
case of Conyon et al. (2002) a random sample stratified by industry.  They include control 
variables in the regression to hold constant differences between the characteristics of the 
control firms and those of the combined firms.   
This approach disregards that takeovers are formed by two firms with different 
characteristics before the merger and these differences might be important for subsequent 
performance.  Specific combinations of target and acquirer characteristics may reflect different 
types of mergers.  For example, a large pharmaceutical company taking over a small, high-
growth IT firm, is likely to have a different motivation and different post-merger strategy than 
two competitors joining in a horizontal merger.  Yet, they are treated as similar events.  
Moreover, prior to the merger the two constituting firms are by construction smaller than 
control observations that have the same size as the combined entity.  If employment growth 
depends on firm size, pre-merger size controls cannot appropriately control simultaneously for 
the expected combined growth rate of the merging firms, which were operating independently 
prior to the merger, as well as for the growth rate of the larger control firms.   
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2.2. Control group: simulated pairs of comparable firms 
To estimate the impact of takeovers on post-merger employment, we need a valid control group 
to construct a counterfactual employment evolution.  We consider explicitly that takeovers 
consist of two firms and choose pairs of firms that do not integrate as comparison group.  This 
so-called ‘dyadic’ approach has been used in the strategic alliance literature which evaluates 
the performance of research joint ventures (Chung, Singh and Lee 2000; Mindruta, Moeen and 
Agarwal 2015).  These are relationships between two independent organizations that choose to 
combine forces depending on the strengths and capabilities of both partners, much like mergers.  
The formation of alliances is modeled as jointly determined by the characteristics of both 
partners.   
In line with this approach, we use as counterfactuals for the takeovers in our sample all 
simulated pairs of non-merging firms that share pre-merger features with the target and the 
acquirer firms.  This approach has three advantages compared to previous merger evaluations.  
First, pairs of non-merging firms provide a more valid counterfactual than single firms to 
represent the potential post-merger employment outcome in the absence of the merger.  Second, 
it allows us to model the probability of a merger as a function of the characteristics of both 
firms, target and acquirer, as well as on the interactions between both firms’ characteristics.  
Existing studies that use a matching estimator model either the probability of a firm becoming 
a target or a firm becoming an acquirer, each time only as a function of the firm’s own 
characteristics.  Third, as we estimate a counterfactual employment for each merger, we do not 
need to limit ourselves to the impact of a representative merger, but we can allow for different 
‘types’ of mergers, defined based on a combination of target and acquirer characteristics, to 
have unique employment effects.  Given that some mergers are motivated by market power or 
consolidation waves, while other mergers aim to combine key assets and strengthen the growth 
potential of the merged firms, it is not implausible that different mergers have different 
employment effects.   
The set of paired non-merging firms that we simulate contains all possible combinations of 
two firms where one satisfies the preconditions of an acquirer and the other those of a target.9  
The treatment effects estimator we introduce below requires a condition of common support.  
                                                 
9 We impose that both firms in the pair cannot be the same firm and that they cannot be part of a merger themselves.   
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We are only able to calculate a valid counterfactual if conditional on the set of covariates the 
probability to be included in a merger is strictly larger than zero and below one.  A large subset 
of firms in our dataset have characteristics that are virtually never observed for merging firms.  
Specifically, very small or very young firms, which constitute the majority of firms in the 
sample, are rarely involved in a takeover.  We therefore restrict the sample of actual and 
potential acquirers to firms with at least 10 employees and at least three years of age in the year 
before a takeover, and the sample of targets to firms with at least 2 employees and at least one 
year in existence in t-1.  This initial reduction of the sample can be considered as a pre-selection 
on observable characteristics.   
To learn which characteristics are important determinants of the likelihood of engaging in a 
merger, we first estimate two selection equations.  They provide useful information in their 
own right regarding the prevalence and type of mergers we observe in our sample.  Since these 
characteristics may differ for acquirers and targets, we estimate the selection equations 
separately for both types of firms.  The exact definitions of the two samples of potential 
acquirers and targets is provided below.  For each of the two options, 𝑥 =  {acquirer, target}, 
the following treatment model is estimated: 
𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑥 = ∑  𝛾𝑎  𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑝
𝑎
𝑎
+ ∑  𝛾𝑏 𝑋𝑘𝑡−𝑝
𝑏
𝑏
+ 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                          (1) 
The dummy variable 𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑥  takes a value of one if firm i is an acquirer (target) between period t–
1 and t.  𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑝
𝑎  is a set of firm-level variables measured at a time before the takeover, 𝑋𝑘𝑡−𝑝
𝑏  are 
a set of industry characteristics, and 𝛾𝑠 and 𝛾𝑡 are industry and year dummies.  We assume the 
extreme value distribution for the error term and estimate equation (1) using a logit model.   
2.3. Exact matching on discrete covariates 
The three studies that evaluated the evolution of total employment for the entire merged entity, 
which we discussed earlier, largely ignore the endogeneity of mergers.  They only include 
several control variables in the performance regression; e.g. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) 
specifically include the R&D to sales ratio to capture potential dependency of merger activity 
on technological change.  We rely more explicitly on the selection-on-observables assumption 
to select a group of appropriate counterfactuals from the full set of all non-merging firm-pairs.  
If employment growth is independent of takeover activity once we condition on a set of 
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covariates, our treatment effects estimator obtains a causal estimate of a merger on the 
employment evolution (Imbens, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). 
Naturally, this is a big assumption and its plausibility depends on the richness of covariates 
available in the dataset.  Our matching variables are chosen to capture the diversity of mergers 
as well as possible. They include the detailed industry of the acquirer and the target (166 
industries) which controls for different types of mergers across combinations of industries.  
They include the size and pre-merger growth performance of both target and acquirer, being a 
major determinant of both takeover decisions and employment growth.  Finally, they include 
two variables that capture the corporate structure of both firms.  As we match exactly on the 
combination of these variables, we allow for millions of possible combinations that can 
represent various determinants of merger decisions and employment growth.   
Moreover, an advantage of using employment growth as dependent variable is the implicit 
conditioning on a firm-fixed effect.  Any difference between merging and control firms that is 
constant over time is controlled for.  Matching exactly on covariates, as we do, is also much 
more flexible than simply including covariates in the performance regression which only 
controls for differences in mean outcomes between treated and controls along each dimension 
separately.  If one is not willing to assume that treatment is exogenous, not even conditionally, 
our estimates have a clear interpretation.  By constructing a valid benchmark, a pair of non-
merging firms observationally equivalent to the merging firms, our estimates capture the 
performance difference explained jointly by the unobservable that leads to the merger and the 
subsequent effect of the merger.  
While much of the literature uses the propensity score to identify close matches (Lehto and 
Böckerman, 2008; Bandick and Görg, 2010), we match firm-pairs exactly on a set of discrete 
pre-merger characteristics of the acquirer and the target.  It eliminates entirely all imbalances 
in observables, i.e. differences between the treated and control groups, and fully exploits the 
limited the number of explanatory variables in our dataset.  Exact matching is feasible because 
we observe a very large number of potential counterfactuals and can thus define cells based on 
the interactions of all covariates.  It allows very flexibly for an important role of combinations 
of characteristics of targets and acquirers.  Remaining differences between observations are all 
within very narrowly defined cells, for firms that share the same values for all covariates.  In 
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contrast, propensity score matching is preferred when the number of covariates is relatively 
large and many variables are continuous.   
The estimation proceeds in two steps.  First, the sample of takeovers and the universe of 
potential control firm-pairs is partitioned into mutually exclusive cells defined by the 
interactions of nine discrete covariates: the year and, for both firms, the industry, a dummy for 
firms affiliated with a company group, and discretized versions (by quartile) of pre-merger firm 
size and growth.  The interaction of these nine matching variables generate 123,450,880 
possible cells, most of which are empty.  Only (observations in) cells that contain at least one 
takeover and one control firm-pair are retained, leaving 2171 cells.10  To keep the number of 
counterfactual pairs per cell to a manageable number, we limit the number of firms that match 
the target characteristics to 150 for each cell (randomly selected).11  Each cell contains between 
1 and 5 takeovers (on average 1.2) and between 1 and 9200 counterfactual pairs.   
In a second step, the treatment effect is calculated simply as an average over all retained 
cells of the difference in employment growth of firms involved in a takeover, the treated 
observations, and the average employment growth for the control firm-pairs in the same cell, 
which represents an estimate of the potential outcome in the absence of treatment, i.e. if the 
firms would not have merged.12  In practice, we estimate the second-stage outcome model using 
the following regression: 
𝑔𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 ,                                                                            (2) 
where 𝑔𝑗𝑡 is the firm-level employment growth rate, and the dummy variable 𝑀𝑗𝑡 takes a value 
of one if pair j is a takeover observation and zero if it is a control firm-pair.  𝛽 represents the 
percentage point difference between the mean employment growth rate of the merged firms j 
and the outcome if they would not have been involved in a takeover.   
                                                 
10 This eliminates 12 percent of all observed takeovers.   
11 This only affects industries with many small firms such as construction, retail or restaurants.  The number of 
firms that match the acquirer characteristics never exceeds 150 per cell.  Observations with outliers in growth 
between t-1 and t are also excluded (growth rates smaller than -50% or larger than +50%).   
12 Given the large number of control firms, our exact matching approach is identical to nearest neighbor matching 
using the propensity score for a set of discrete covariates.  It is also identical to a regression adjustment estimator 
with fully interacted discrete covariates (Imbens, 2004).  Our strategy is similar to stratified matching (Anderson, 
Kish and Cornell, 1980) and coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King and Porro, 2012) which share the advantage 
of exact matching that bias is reduced and precision gained as the number of subclasses is increased.   
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As there are many more control than treated observations, we need to use weights to obtain 
the correct difference in average growth rates.  The weights 𝑤𝑗𝑡
𝑐  assigned to an observation jt 
in cell c, are equal to: 
𝑤𝑗𝑡
𝑐 = {
 1                             if  𝑀𝑗𝑡 = 1 
∑ 𝑀𝑗𝑡𝑗𝑡∈𝑐
∑ (1 − 𝑀𝑗𝑡)𝑗𝑡∈𝑐
    if  𝑀𝑗𝑡 = 0.
                                                  (3) 
In a cell with 𝑁𝑐 control observations and only a single takeover, which is the most common 
situation, all controls receive a weight of 1/𝑁𝑐.  As observations within cells can contain similar 
firms, we report cluster-robust standard errors.  This relaxes the independence assumption and 
requires only that the residuals of the performance equation are distributed independently 
across the cells.   
The regression model (2) is used to estimate the impact of takeovers on employment growth 
between the last observation prior to and the first observation after the transaction (t-1 to t).  
Since labor force adjustments can take time or takeovers can have a persistent impact on 
employment growth, we extend the dependent variables to growth rates up to the 3-years after 
the takeover.  The post-merger impact will be estimated both as year-on-year employment 
changes, as well as cumulated changes over the entire post-merger periods.  The first provide 
information on the dynamic adjustment paths conditional on surviving, while the latter give 
insight in the long-term employment gains or losses following a takeover.   
Following Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996),  we calculate growth rates as employment 
changes relative to the average of employment at the beginning and end of the period 
considered.13  These growth rates range from -2 for exits to +2 for entrants, show job creation 
and destruction symmetrically, and are bounded away from infinity.  Divestitures and 
                                                 
13 Denoting employment of observation j in year t as 𝐸𝑗𝑡 , the k-year growth rate equals 𝑔𝑗𝑡 = (𝐸𝑗𝑡 − 𝐸𝑗𝑡−𝑘) ?̅?𝑗𝑡⁄ , 
with ?̅?𝑗𝑡 = (𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝐸𝑗𝑡−𝑘) 2⁄ .  These growth rates are close to the more commonly used logarithmic growth rates 
𝑔𝑗𝑡 = ln(𝐸𝑗𝑡 𝐸𝑗𝑡−𝑘⁄ ), especially for small changes.  An advantage is that we do not have to restrict the analysis to 
surviving firms.  As our sample includes many small firms, we want to allow for the possibility of exit and 
associated employment loss as an outcome in the post-merger years.  As mentioned, we use as dependent variables 
both employment growth over n-year periods, which calculates changes from t–1 to t+n for n={1,2,3} for all 
observations, and year-on-year employment growth, which calculates changes from t+n–1 to t+n for n={1,2,3} 
and conditions on survival to t+n–1.   
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additional changes in the firm structure are accounted for by an employment imputation 
procedure discussed in Section 4.   
The exact matching with counterfactual pairs of firms for each takeover allows for a flexible 
way to introduce heterogeneous employment effects of takeovers, depending on the joint 
features of the acquiring and the target firm.  To allow for differences in effect by merger-type, 
we define a various subsets of mergers using combined acquirer and target firm characteristics.  
We then evaluate whether the estimated takeover effect differs significantly for different 
subsets by introducing in equation (2) a dummy variable 𝑆𝑗𝑡 for the subset, as well as its 
interaction with the takeover dummy: 
𝑔𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑆𝑗𝑡 +  𝛿𝑀𝑗𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡+𝜀𝑗𝑡 .                                                      (4) 
The coefficient of interest is now 𝛿, which measures the difference in the takeover effect on 
employment growth for the mergers in the subset relative to the average for all other mergers.   
3. Data 
The analysis is based on the register of Belgian employers maintained by the National Social 
Security Office.  It covers all private firms with at least one employee in the period from 2003 
to 2012.  Firm employment is measured as the number of employees on June 30 of each year.14  
Information on the control structure of firms—i.e., whether they are part of a domestic or 
foreign enterprise group—is taken from a dataset provided by Statistics Belgium.  An overview 
of all variables and their exact construction is provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
We identify takeovers or mergers between two or more firms between 2005 and 2012 using 
two methods, which are discussed in detail in the next section.  It leaves us with an unbalanced 
panel of firms that includes at least two years of information prior to each merger in order to 
observe control variables.   
Some takeovers, namely those involving temporary agencies and firms in highly subsidized 
sectors, are excluded to avoid measurement error due to firms with incomparable growth 
                                                 
14 In an average year, the sample includes 178,000 firms and 2,070,000 employees.   
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patterns.15  As noted before, the few takeovers by very young or small acquirers are dropped 
and we also exclude takeovers where the target is very small compared to the acquirer.  These 
events do not correspond to substantial workforce integrations, which is the focus of our study, 
and they do not satisfy the common support condition as they have an almost zero probability 
of occurring.  Remaining takeovers in our sample satisfy the following conditions:  The 
acquirer has at least 10 employees and is at least 4 years old in the year before the transaction 
(t-1);  the target has at least 2 employees and is at least 1 year old in t-1;  the target represents 
at least 1 percent of employment of the combined entity;  the merged entity survives in t.  Of 
all firms not involved in a takeover, firm-year observations that meet these same conditions are 
used to construct potential counterfactuals.16   
We control carefully for other changes in the firm structure that may occur before or after 
the takeover.  Takeovers can be accompanied by divestitures of parts of the firm in the year of 
the transaction or in the post-merger period.  Moreover, firms may engage in another merger, 
split up, or disappear from the dataset because they change identification number.  Statistics in 
Table A.2 show that firms involved in a takeover have a much higher probability to be involved 
in an additional restructuring than other firms.  Studies that do not control for such events are 
likely to measure employment levels in the post-merger period with error, which will bias 
estimates of takeover effects on employment growth.17  We control for ID changes and changes 
in the firm structure that occur before or after the takeover period using three record linking 
methods: employee-flow record linking, probabilistic matching, and relying on supplementary 
data sources.  They allow us to reconstruct consistent employment histories of firms involved 
in a takeover three years before and three years after the transaction.18   
The source data contains information on the firms’ industry at the NACE 4-digit level.  The 
selection equations that we estimate include industry dummies or time-varying variables at 
various levels of aggregation.  Knowledge intensive industries are identified using the Eurostat 
                                                 
15 Temporary agencies exhibit continuous reshuffling of legal entities within enterprise groups;  firms in highly 
subsidized sectors experience employment growth that strongly depends on changes in policy measures.   
16 A firm may be included in a control firm-pair in each year it satisfies these conditions.  Note that potential 
acquirers are a subset of potential targets. 
17 Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) partly address this problem by introducing a dummy for divestiture activity.   
18 This process is briefly described in the Appendix and documented in greater detail in Geurts (2016) and Geurts 
and Van Biesebroeck (2016).  
  
 
14 
 
 
classification of Knowledge Intensive Activities and declining industries are defined as 2-digit 
sectors that exhibited negative output growth between t-3 and t-1.  We also use a ratio of 
industry concentration, equal to the employment share of the four largest firms at the 3-digit 
level in t-1, and a dummy for increasing concentration if this share increases from t-3 to t.  
Table A.1 in the Appendix provides more detail on the exact construction of these variables. 
4. Takeover activity 
4.1. Frequency of takeover activity 
Most previous studies focus on mergers and acquisitions by listed or large firms which results 
in relatively small samples even for large countries and over extended periods.  For example, 
Conyon et al. (2002) use a sample of 277 mergers and acquisitions for the UK over 21 years 
(1975-1996).  Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) study 646 mergers and acquisitions for the whole 
of the U.S. and Europe over 11 years (1987-1998).  
A few studies use a different approach to identify a comprehensive set of mergers for a 
particular jurisdiction.  Lehto and Böckerman (2008) for Finland and Burghardt and Helm 
(2015) for Switzerland construct a sample that covers the universe of transfers of control for 
active establishments in the respective countries.  The first study relies on reports by a trade 
magazine and records all instances where a transaction changes which firm owns at least 50% 
of an establishment.  It excludes targets or acquirers with annual turnover below 
(approximately) €500,000 and separately identifies takeovers by foreign firms with no prior 
presence in Finland.  In total, 7923 establishments experienced an ownership change over a 15-
year period (1989-2013), or an average of 566 per year.  Takeovers are pro-cyclical and their 
frequency is greatly influenced by industry restructurings that can lead to hundreds of 
establishments changing ownership in a single year.   
The second study identifies all establishments where the identification number of the 
controlling firm changes for any reason between the 2001 and 2005 business censuses.  It drops 
firms that only own a single establishment in 2005 in order to exclude simple ownership 
changes.  Comparing takeover frequency with the complete Swiss business census shows that 
of the 305,410 active establishments in 2001 that survived to 2005, 5489 (1.54%) changed 
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ownership over those 4 years.  This rate was almost twice as high for service establishments 
(1.64%) as for manufacturing (0.89%). 
Brown and Medoff (1988) start from the universe of employers that report to the Michigan 
Unemployment Insurance system.  In the payroll records, they observe when employers with 
different firm identifiers integrate.  In total they identify 2829 mergers or acquisitions that 
involve at least two firms over a 6.5 year period.  They do not report enough summary statistics 
to calculate the likelihood a firm is involved in a transaction, but they mention that the entire 
sample counts more than 200,000 firms.  A notable finding is that the employment effects of a 
takeover differ by type.  In only 15% of the cases do the firms integrate their two workforces, 
mere transfers of assets (control) are much more common.  Ownership changes that only lead 
to a transfer of assets tend to be associated with employment reductions, while instances where 
firms integrate their workforces on average lead to employment expansions.   
Given our interest in the role of mergers and takeovers in the overall growth process, we use 
a procedure that focuses on firm integration.  In our sample, a takeover is defined as the 
integration of two previously independent Belgian employer firms into a single legal unit.19  
We identify them by relying on two sources of information. 
The first source is a dataset compiled by Statistics Belgium based on all official mergers and 
acquisition approved by the Commercial Court.  It includes share deals between companies 
where the buyer becomes the owner of the other legal entity and acquires the target’s shares 
and assets as well as all existing liabilities and debts.20 
The second source is based on employee-flow linkages between firms using a linked 
employer-employee dataset (Geurts 2016; Geurts and Van Biesebroeck, 2016).  A takeover is 
defined as an event where an existing company absorbs the workforce of another firm and the 
latter is dissolved after the transaction.  The dissolved firm is defined as the target and the firm 
that continues as the acquirer.  A merger is identified as two firms that are dissolved and merge 
                                                 
19 Independency is based on the official firm identification number which corresponds to separate firms under 
Belgian law.  Before the merger, each firm pays its own social security contributions, corporate taxes, and fills 
out individual annual accounts.  After the merger, these obligations are fulfilled by the joint entity. 
20 Not all takeovers are subject to a Commercial Court procedure.  Asset deals, mergers between firms owned by 
the same corporation, and buy and sell operations can be executed without approval by the Commercial Court. 
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their workforces into a newly created firm, represented by a new firm identifier.21  In such case, 
we label the largest firm as the acquirer.  Our method only picks up events where the workforce 
reallocation between the two firms includes at least 5 employees.  
The vast majority of observations in our sample are takeovers, which means in practice that 
no new firm identifier is created.  Plain mergers represent less than 3 percent of our sample.  In 
line with previous studies, we do not distinguish between ‘takeovers’ and ‘mergers’ and use 
the terms interchangeably.  When several firms are taken over in the same year, the transactions 
are collapsed into a single event.  Takeovers in different years are included as separate events. 
Using these two sources that encompass merger activity irrespective of size and company 
type or shareholder structure, we find that takeover activity is a much more dynamic and 
frequent process than one would expect based on most studies of mergers.  Even for the 
relatively small Belgian economy, we identify over a 7-year period a comprehensive set of 
2601 domestic takeovers, or an average of 372 takeovers each year, that involve 3400 target 
firms.  They involve both small and large firms and affect an important share of employment. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 shows the population and employment coverage of acquirers and targets involved 
in these takeovers.  Combined they represent 0.74 of active firms in a given year, targets make 
up a somewhat higher share than acquirers (0.42 versus 0.32 percent of all firms), as multiple 
firms may be acquired in a single takeover.  Because takeover activity is more likely among 
larger firms, firms involved in takeovers account for an important share of employment.  In an 
average year, more than 4 percent of all employees in the Belgian private sector work for a 
company that is involved in a takeover that year: 3.5 percent are employed by an acquiring firm 
and 0.8 percent by relatively smaller target firms.  Over an average 5-year period, firms that 
engage in takeover activity cover 17 percent of total private employment.  The two sources are 
complementary for the identification of takeovers.  The Commercial Court files identify 
58 percent of all takeovers in the sample, but most of these are also picked up by the employee-
                                                 
21 More specifically, a takeover corresponds to an event where at least 50 percent of the individual employees of 
the dissolved firm is transferred to the incumbent.  Similarly, a merger corresponds to the transfer of at least 50 
percent of the individual employees of two dissolved firms into a new legal entity.  Most takeovers and mergers 
in the sample correspond to transfers of close to 100 percent of the workforces into the combined entity. 
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flow method, which covers 85 percent of the sample.  42 percent of takeovers are only 
identified by the employee-flow method and a small share, including mainly smaller firms, is 
only found in the Commercial Court files.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
Takeover activity varies strongly by sector as shown in Figure 2.  Firms in Energy are most 
likely to engage in a takeover (1.8% per year), followed by firms in Transport, Manufacturing 
and Business services.  In terms of employment, employees in Energy and Business services 
are most likely to be affected (ca. 6%), followed by Manufacturing (5%).  Takeover activity in 
these sectors is relatively more concentrated among larger firms. The statistics in panel (b) 
provide more information about the sample composition.  More takeovers are by firms in Trade 
than in any other sector, but the absolute number of firms in a takeover (as targets or acquirers) 
is large as well in Business services and Manufacturing.  Together, these three broad sectors 
make up 71 percent of the sample. 
4.2. Characteristics of acquirer and target firms 
Table 1 summarizes pre-merger characteristics of acquirers and targets, and compares them to 
the more than 800,000 firm-year observations of non-merging firms that could serve as valid 
counterfactuals.  The three subsets differ widely on a set of basic features, highlighting the 
importance of the matching approach.  Acquirers employ on average 189 employees in the year 
before the merger.  They are 6 times larger than target firms, and more than 10 times larger 
than the average non-merging firms.  Size distributions are strongly right-skewed, as can be 
seen from the much smaller median sizes of 45, 12 and 4 employees respectively.  The median 
sizes further illustrate why it is vital not to focus only on takeovers by large firms.  Even the 
majority of acquiring firms are relatively small.   
[Table 1 about here] 
Pre-merger performance differs greatly as well.  The average employment growth of 
acquirers in the two-year period before the merger is 4.6 percent, compared to 8.9 percent for 
targets.  This difference mostly reflects the age conditions we imposed on the two samples: 
acquirers are at least 4 years old and targets at least one year old.  If targets that enter in t-2 are 
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excluded, their average growth rate turns negative (-4.5 percent).22  Growth rates of non-
merging firms are much higher, at 22.7 percent overall, or 9.5 percent if entrants are similarly 
excluded.  Their high growth rates is again partly explained by their younger age composition: 
more than 18 percent are 5 years or younger, while this share is only 1.2 percent among 
acquirers and 5.5 percent among target firms.  The averages mask wide underlying variation, 
as can be seen from the large standard deviations.  Differences across sectors explain part of 
this variation, but standard deviations are also large within sectors.   
Another difference between the subsamples is that firms involved in a takeover are more 
likely to have been involved in another firm restructuring before the merger.  This can be 
another merger, a split-up, ownership change or another form of restructuring involving 
multiple firms.  More than 20 percent of acquirers and 10 percent of targets have been involved 
in a restructuring in the 5-year period before the merger.  The corresponding share for non-
merging firms is only 6 percent.  Finally, firms involved in a takeover are much more likely to 
be part of a larger company group than non-merging firms, and they engage more often in 
foreign direct investment.  More than half of the acquirers are part of an enterprise group and 
11.5 percent were engaged in (inward or outward) FDI in the period before the merger. The 
shares are somewhat lower for target firms and minor for non-merging firms.  
As counterfactuals for each of the takeovers, our matching procedure will select pairs from 
the large set of non-merging firms that are similar to the acquirer and target firms.  In Table 2 
we show some patterns that illustrate the importance of accounting for the features of each firm 
on its own as well as taking into account their combined characteristics.  Results in panel (a) 
show how the average size of the target firm increases almost as strongly across the size 
quartiles of acquirers as the acquirers’ own size, and vice versa for the size quartiles of targets.  
Even though most targets are small enough to be feasible takeover targets for a large majority 
of acquirers—e.g. almost 90 percent of targets are smaller than the median acquirer and the 
75th percentile in size of targets approximately equals the 25th percentile for acquirers—there 
is a strong association between the two firms’ relative sizes. 
[Table 2 about here] 
                                                 
22 According to our definition, growth rates of entrants equal 200 percent. 
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Panel (b) reports that a similar type of assortative matching takes place based on pre-merger 
growth rates.  The relationship is almost as monotonic as for size in panel (a), but with one 
exception.  Acquirers with growth rates in the bottom quartile, which on average are strongly 
negative, tend to take over targets that have an average growth rate close to the overall mean.  
Similarly, targets that show the slowest growth, which is even more negative on average, tend 
to be taken over by acquirers with average growth rates.  Our exact matching procedure based 
on the interaction of characteristics allows flexibly for such systematic patterns. 
We next describe estimates of selection equation (1).  The objective is both to provide 
insights into which type of firms enter into mergers, as well as to illustrate the predictive power 
of the variables that we use in the exact matching.  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 show results 
for the acquirer dummy as dependent variable and columns (3) and 4) show results for targets.23  
[Table 3 about here] 
The linear and quadratic size variables imply that the probability of being an acquirer or 
target increases concavely with firm size (measured by employment).  The more negative 
squared term for targets indicates that the positive effect of size decreases more rapidly for 
them.  Lagged growth is negatively correlated with takeover activity.  Firms that increase 
employment more rapidly are less likely to be an acquirer and especially less likely to be a 
takeover target.  Being part of an enterprise group significantly increases the probability of 
engaging in a takeover, while the coefficient on the FDI dummy is estimated much less 
precisely and also less robustly.  One reason is that it is highly correlated with the enterprise 
group dummy.  If the FDI dummy is included on its own, the point estimate is strongly positive 
for both acquirers and targets.  When included in addition to the enterprise group dummy, it is 
estimated much smaller for targets and even switches sign for acquirers. 
The results in columns (1) and (3) include broad sector and year fixed effects, but also a 
number of time-varying industry characteristics that are measured at a more detailed level.  
They show that firms in declining industries are less likely to be the target of an acquisition, 
while this feature has no significant effect on being an acquirer.  In contrast, firms in knowledge 
                                                 
23 Note that the number of observations differs for the two regressions because they are either based on the 
subsample of firm-year observations that satisfy the preconditions of an acquirer, or the preconditions of a target. 
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intensive sectors are more likely to engage in takeovers and this positive effect is especially 
pronounced for targets.  Companies in highly concentrated industries are significantly less 
likely to acquire other firms and this tendency is further diminished if the industry has recently 
become more concentrated.  At the same time, however, there is some evidence for merger 
waves as an increasing level of industry concentration is strongly associated with firms in an 
industry being taken over, and a high existing level of concentration does not deter this.  The 
opposing coefficients for acquirers and targets suggests that the two sides of these transactions 
often come from different industries. 
For the results in columns (2) and (4), the broad industry-fixed effects and the detailed 
industry variables that only varied slightly over time are replaced by a full set of 166 industry-
fixed effects at the NACE 3-digit level.  Compared to the earlier results, the absolute 
magnitudes of most coefficient estimates decline slightly, but changes are minor.  All firm-
level coefficients remain highly significant. 
In Table A.3 in the Appendix, we use the more flexible results with detailed industry-fixed 
effects to verify whether results are similar for acquirers and targets identified using either of 
the two data sources used to identify takeovers.  We first show estimates for takeovers that are 
legally obliged to obtain approval of the Commercial Court, which produces a sample of 
takeovers more similar to Lehto and Böckerman (2008) and Burghardt and Helm (2015).  In 
the other columns we presents results for takeovers that are only picked up by the employee-
flow method.  The results in both subsamples are very similar, suggesting that the less 
conventional employee-flow method picks up reorganizations between firms that do not 
fundamentally differ from officially registered takeovers.  Two differences have an obvious 
explanation.  First, the larger size coefficient for targets in column (4) is a direct result of the 
employee-flow method which by construction does not identify takeovers of very small firms 
(i.e. with fewer than 5 employees).  Second, the larger coefficient for the enterprise group 
dummies in columns (1) and (3) suggest that firms belonging to a larger corporation are likely 
to be subject to more stringent legal obligations and therefore more likely to appear in the 
Commercial Court files.  
  
 
21 
 
 
5. Employment effects of takeovers 
5.1. Pre- and post-matching statistics 
The earlier results highlighted the importance of constructing a valid control group.  Firms in 
takeovers differ notably from non-merging firms and even acquirers differ from targets, 
requiring separate control groups for the two subsets.  We also found substantial variation in 
the features of the partner that acquirers choose to ally with, which we account for by selecting 
as counterfactuals pairs of firms that jointly match the characteristics of both partners.  
More specifically, the nine (discrete) matching variables that we use are the base year of the 
takeover period (t-1); the NACE 3-digit industry codes of the acquirer and the target; the size 
quartile of the acquirer in t-1, defined within each industry-year; the lagged growth quartiles 
of the acquirer and the target between t-3 and t-1 (with an additional category for targets that 
enter in t-2), also defined within industry-years; dummies indicating whether the acquirer and 
target are part of a company group; and finally, a dummy indicating whether the employment 
share of the target in the combined entity in t-1 is above the median share for the full sample 
(which equals 0.25). 
Table 4 illustrates the result of the exact matching procedure.  It shows side-by-side the 
averages for the 9 (numbered) matching variables, on the left for the full sample of takeovers 
and potential matches, and on the right for the takeovers that remain in the final sample and the 
matched firm-pairs.  The first rows show that the number of takeovers is reduced after matching 
in order to satisfy the common support assumption.  While the sample contains about 165,000 
observations of non-merging firms that satisfy the preconditions of an acquirer in t-1, and 
725,000 that satisfy the preconditions of a target, the sample of paired firms after matching 
includes more than 1.7 million observations.  The statistics for these pairs, as reported in the 
other rows of Table 5, are based on weighted averages with the weights defined in equation (3).  
[Table 4 about here] 
Results in the third and last columns, labeled |A-B| and |C-D|, show that differences between 
firms in takeovers and the control group are strongly reduced after matching.  The exact 
matching procedure necessarily leads to the two samples being perfectly balanced for all 
discrete variables, i.e. by 3-digit sector and year (rows 1,2 and 1,3), as well as by the share of 
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firms that are part of an enterprise group (rows 4 and 5).  For the last four variables we match 
exactly on the quartile, but report the averages for the continuous size and growth variables.24  
Differences in the means and medians of firm size (rows 6 and 7) and growth rates (rows 8 and 
9) are strongly reduced after matching, but do not disappear entirely.  The strong reduction in 
the absolute size difference between targets and controls is an indirect effect, as we only match 
on the relative size of the target in the merged entity. 
As important as the balancing of takeovers and counterfactuals with respect to the 
characteristics of acquirers and targets individually, is that the matching procedure imposes 
similarity between the two samples regarding the joint characteristics of both partners.  Since 
no equivalent for pairs of firms exists in the pre-matching control group, we cannot illustrate 
this gain in a similar way. 
5.2. Average effect of takeovers on firm employment growth 
Table 5 presents the results for the impact of takeovers on firm-level employment growth until 
the third year after the transaction.  In panel (a) we report the effects on year-on-year 
employment growth and in panel (b) the effects on growth rates calculated over the entire n-
year post-merger period.  The coefficients measure the average treatment effects on the treated, 
estimated using outcome model (2) and comparing the outcome for the takeover to the average 
outcome for control firm-pairs that exactly match the acquirer and the target on a set of 
characteristics.   
[Table 5 about here] 
The first column of panel (a) shows that takeovers have a small but significantly negative 
impact on the employment of the combined entity immediately following the merger.  
Employment growth is 2.3 percentage points lower than it would have been without the merger.  
Results in the next columns indicate that the adverse effect persists for several years.  Growth 
continues to be approximately 2 percentage points lower than for the benchmark firms in the 
                                                 
24 It means that for a takeover that involves an acquirer in the first size-quartile and a target in the second size-
quartile, we form all possible pairs of non-merging firms from the same industry in the same year, that fall in the 
exact same size quartiles.  While the size-quartiles will be identical for the takeovers and controls, as is also the 
case for the five discrete variables listed first, the exact firm sizes will still vary somewhat. 
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three years after the transaction, and differences remain highly significant.  The employment 
contraction only diminishes by the fourth year after the transaction.  
Panel (b) shows the impact on employment over the entire post-merger period, i.e. from the 
pre-merger employment level in t-1 to the nth year after the transaction.  These estimates do 
not condition anymore on surviving in the preceding period, and confirm the persistent and 
strongly negative impact of takeover activity on firm employment growth.  By the first full 
year after the merger, employment relative to the pre-merger level is reduced by more than 
4 percent.  Measured over the 3-year post-merger period, the cumulative adverse effect 
amounts to more than 8 percentage points lower employment growth than experienced by non-
merging firm-pairs.  As a robustness check we varied the number of control observations or 
conditioned throughout on survival until t+3, but the point estimates, which are reported in 
Table A.4 in the Appendix, are remarkably invariant to these changes. 
Finally, in panel (c) we report the effects of takeovers on the change in growth rates after 
the merger, which confirm the adverse effect of takeovers on the employment evolution.   
While the results for employment growth in panels (a) and (b) control for a firm-fixed effects 
in the employment level, the effects on the growth acceleration even control for a firm-fixed 
component in employment growth.  The first column compares employment growth in the year 
of the takeover with the growth rate in the year before the merger.  The second column presents 
results based on a comparison of two-year growth rates.  The negative coefficients of -0.8 and 
-3.0 indicate that employment growth of firms involved in a takeover significantly slows down. 
Our exact matching approach requires all covariates to be categorical and we discretized 
four of the matching variables: the absolute size of the acquirer, the relative size of the target, 
and the pre-merger growth rates of both firms.  The summary statistics in Table 4 show that it 
leaves some variation in the underlying continuous variables within the detailed cells as defined 
by the interaction of all nine discrete covariates.  Other treatment effects estimators allow for 
continuous variables and, for example, match on the propensity score.  The possible gain in 
matching accuracy comes at a cost of being less flexible in the interaction between acquirer 
and target characteristics.   
We can add an additional step in our algorithm and instead of estimating the average 
treatment effect as the difference in simple within-cell averages, we can use a treatment effects 
estimator that controls for the remaining heterogeneity in the continuous variables.  But the 
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gain in matching precision comes at a price.  For the common support condition to hold within 
cells, we cannot use the same industry detail, defined by the combined NACE 3-digit codes of 
the acquirer and the target.  As observations that closely match on pre-merger size and growth 
can often not be found in these very detailed cells (166*166 industries), it would drop many 
takeovers from the analysis.  We therefore have to use coarser industry definitions, i.e. the 
NACE 2-digit level for the acquirer and the broad sector affiliation of the target.25  We include 
the three other matching variables (year of observation and dummies for enterprise group) as 
before. 
In Table A.5 in the Appendix we show results using propensity score matching and inverse-
probability-weighted regression-adjustment that use the continuous values for four of the 
matching variables.  To ease the computational burden, the estimates are based on a subsample 
with exactly 30 matches per takeover and panel (a) repeats the baseline results for this 
subsample using exact matching.  The coefficient estimates for the two alternative estimators 
in panels (b) and (c) show slightly less pronounced effects of takeover activity on post-merger 
employment growth.  The difference between the estimates are minor—effects are reduced by 
one tenth, on average, and the largest reduction is by one fifth—and the standard errors are 
highly similar, illustrating the robustness of our results. 
5.3. Differential effects by type of firm 
The average effects of takeovers on employment growth that we estimated above could mask 
large differences between takeovers.  We now investigate whether differences in post-merger 
employment growth are systematically related to observable characteristics of acquirers or 
target firms. 
Table 6 shows such differential impacts by splitting the sample approximately in half using 
individual firm or industry characteristics.  Each coefficient is estimated using a separate 
regression like equation (4), where the subset dummy is defined using a single characteristic.  
The table reports the 𝛿 coefficient on the interaction between the takeover and subset dummies.  
The top panel uses firm-level characteristics that are binary versions of the matching variables, 
                                                 
25 The NACE 2-digit level and the broad sector affiliation comprises 76 and 9 categories, respectively.  As the 
estimation for the 3- and 4-period growth rates are based on fewer takeovers, only the broad sector affiliation of 
both partners can be used there. 
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as well as a dummies for foreign ownership.  The lower panel uses industry features and also 
reports the few instances where the effect in a particular takeover year was systematically 
different from the average. 
[Table 6 about here] 
No variable has a significant effect on employment growth in all four periods.  The large 
standard errors of most coefficients suggest substantial variation within subsets, which may be 
explained by other features of the takeovers or may simply be idiosyncratic.  Of all the firm-
level characteristics, only the relative size of the target leads to a significantly different effect 
in two of the four periods.  Employment contractions in the 2- and 4-year periods after the 
transaction are less pronounced when relatively small firms are acquired.  It is only natural that 
the potential for workforce rationalizations in the combined entity is more limited when a firm 
takes over a much smaller target.  Pre-merger performance has a significant and positive effect 
on the merger outcome as well, but only in the period of the transaction itself.  The coefficients 
remain positive in all post-merger periods, but are not longer statistically significant. 
Overall, we find that firm-level features do not lead to systematically different post-merger 
outcomes.  Most remarkable are the small differences and entirely insignificant coefficient 
estimates for the vertical merger dummy, which takes a value of one if the two firms are not in 
the same NACE 3-digit industry.  Several authors have discussed the relevance of 
distinguishing between horizontal and vertical mergers (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007) and 
empirical studies based on small samples of takeovers by large or listed firms have highlighted 
differential impacts, although going in either direction (see Conyon et al. 2002 and Gugler et 
al. 2003).  Below, we show that the industry relatedness does play a role in post-merger 
outcomes, but only when other characteristics of the acquirer and target are taken into account.  
Results in the lower panel of Table 6 indicate that most industry characteristics of the 
merging firms do not explain differences in post-merger outcomes either.  We find insignificant 
coefficients for takeovers with an acquirer or a target operating in manufacturing, in an industry 
with declining output growth in the year before the merger, in an industry with a high or 
increasing level of concentration, or in a knowledge-intensive industry.  The large standard 
errors again suggest substantial variation among takeovers within these types of industries.  
The only feature that does have a significant effect on post-merger employment growth is a 
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Trade or services affiliation. Takeovers with an acquirer (a target) in this sector lead to 
relatively more positive employment outcomes from the first (second) post-merger period 
onwards.26 
5.4. Differential effects by type of takeover 
Our matching strategy is based on a paired perspective: counterfactual pairs of firms have been 
selected on the basis of the joint similarity with both the acquirer and the target of the observed 
takeovers.  The decision to expand or contract the workforce following the transaction could 
also depend on the joint characteristics of both partners.  While the individual firm or industry 
characteristics of the two merging firms did not predict differences in post-merger employment 
outcomes, we now show that outcomes are often significantly different if we look at acquirer 
and target characteristics in combination.  The joint features of both partners implicitly define 
different types of mergers or takeovers.  
A first way of showing this is to estimate separate effects for a large number of detailed 
subsets.  We define 27 or 128 non-overlapping subsets using the full interaction of seven 
dummy variables that correspond to binary versions of the matching variables.27  They are 
dummies for vertical mergers, acquirers in the largest size quartile, acquirers and targets with 
above average pre-merger growth, acquirers and targets that are part of a company group, and 
a target share in the combined entity larger than 25 percent. We estimate a separate employment 
effect for each subset relative to all other takeovers using separate regressions of specification 
(4).  We only report the coefficients for the 71 subsets with at least 10 takeovers. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 3 shows the distribution over all subsets of the estimated takeover effects for the two-
period employment growth rate (from t-1 to t+1).  The horizontal axis of the histogram shows 
the total effects (𝛽 + 𝛿) for each subset relative to the appropriate control group.  Since each 
subset includes only a small number of takeovers, 𝛽 approximately equals the average takeover 
effect in the sample, which equals -4.6 percent and is indicated by the vertical line.  The black 
                                                 
26 Note however that the overall effect (𝛽 + 𝛿) is still negative and statistically significant. 
27 Of the nine matching variables, the industry codes of the acquirer and the target are now captured by a single 
vertical merger dummy and the year of observation is not included to define takeover types. 
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areas of the histogram indicate subsets for which the takeover effect differs significantly from 
the average effect (𝛿 significantly different from 𝛽 at the 10 percent significance level).   
In several cases we find a takeover effect that differs strongly from the average.  In 
17 percent of the subsets, the total effect on employment is even positive, while in 18 percent 
of the subsets, takeovers reduce employment by more than 10 percent over two years.  In most 
cases, however, the takeover effect does not differ significantly from the mean.  The reason is 
that most mutually exclusive subsets contain only a small number of observations, on average 
28 takeovers and their controls.  As a result, only in the tails of the distribution do we find 
subsets where the takeover effect is significantly different.28 
A second way to illustrate that post-merger employment outcomes can depend on the 
combination of attributes of the acquirer and the target firm, is to zoom in on two examples for 
very distinct types of mergers.  Lumping together some of the subsets that were shown in Figure 
3, we highlight, first, that differences in outcomes can be very pronounced, and second, that 
the unique effect disappears when a feature of either the acquirer or the target firm is changed.  
Before illustrating these patterns, we briefly discuss a possible rationale behind the very 
negative or positive employment outcomes in those particular examples. 
[Table 7 about here] 
The first example looks at takeovers by acquirers that operate in industries with negative 
output growth in the three years before the merger.  Horizontal mergers in industries with 
declining demand have been hypothesized to be motivated by efficiency gains through capacity 
rationalization (Dutz, 1989).  In such a situation, a merger may allow firms to retire older, 
outdated equipment or technologies and combine the most promising parts of each firm with 
state-of-the-art technology.  This is expected to raise labor productivity and lead to workforce 
reductions.  Results in Table 5 did not show an overall more negative effect for takeovers in 
                                                 
28 The three subsets with a takeover effect that is significantly more negative are all horizontal mergers between 
two firms with a below-average pre-merger growth, and a target that represents more than 25 percent of the 
combined entity (but with different values for the other three dummy variables).  The three subsets where the 
effect is significantly more positive are also horizontal mergers, but now the merging firms are both part of an 
enterprise group, the acquirer is large and the target represents only a small share of the combined entity.  The 
other four subsets in the right tale of the distribution, but with insignificant 𝛿 coefficients, are all vertical mergers, 
but with different values for the other characteristics. 
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declining industries, but we now investigate whether effects are systematically different when 
we additionally condition on other characteristics. 
In panel (a) of Table 7, we first present results for the full sample including both horizontal 
and vertical mergers and takeovers with small and large target shares, again estimated by 
equation (4).  It contains estimates for three subsets.  The first subset of takeovers is defined 
by the combination of three features: (i) acquirers are in a declining industry, (ii) they are part 
of an enterprise group, and (iii) targets had above average pre-merger growth within their 
industry.  The main takeover effects 𝛽 apply to all pairs of firms not included in this subset, or 
more than 90 percent of takeovers.  Hence, they are very close to the average for the full sample.  
The interaction effects 𝛿 are the differential employment impacts for the subset of interest and 
are estimated to be large and significantly positive in each of the four periods.  The relative 
post-merger employment growth is much more favorable for this type of acquisitions.  The 
difference is already 3 percentage points in the period of the transaction and grows to almost 
17 percentage points over the full 4-year post-merger period from t–1 to t+3.  The overall 
employment effect in the subset, equal to 𝛽 + 𝛿, is positive for each period and even 
statistically significant over the full 4-year period.29 
Importantly, the estimates in Table 7 for the other two subsets show that the above pattern 
only holds for the specific combination of acquirers in declining industries and high-growth 
targets.  Changing the attributes of either of the merging firms has a large impact on the results.  
Estimates for subset 2 show that if the same type of acquirer takes over a target that exhibited 
below-average pre-merger growth, the pattern disappears.  Employment effects of those 
takeovers are not significantly different from the average effect.  Most point estimates of the 
interaction term are even negative, but they are never significant.  Similarly, if we still focus 
on high-growth targets, but look at takeovers by acquirers from expanding industries (subset 
3), employment differences are again indistinguishable from the average evolution. 
                                                 
29 The (𝛽 + 𝛿) total effect has a difference-in-differences interpretation, measuring the change in employment for 
takeovers in the subset relative to the change in employment change for the appropriate control group.  The 𝛿 
parameter has a triple-difference interpretation, comparing the differences in employment growth for takeovers in 
the subset with the employment growth for the other takeovers, normalizing both growth rates by the average rate 
of growth in the corresponding control group. 
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The results in panel (b) show that these findings are not confounded by observations where 
the target is relatively small compared to the acquirer.  When we restrict the sample to mergers 
with relatively large targets only, the differences are even more pronounced.  Results in panel 
(c), which restricts the sample to horizontal mergers only, are very similar to subset 1.  In each 
case, the employment evolution is more positive for takeovers that involve an acquirer in a 
declining industry and a high-growth target, the opposite pattern as predicted by the merger 
theory discussed above.  Even more importantly, both patterns disappear when we change one 
of the firms characteristics, which we illustrate with the estimates on subset 2. 
Table 8 presents a second example that illustrates how a unique employment effect can 
depend crucially on the combination of features of the acquirer and the target.  Here we look 
at takeovers where the acquirers are relatively small, i.e. in the first to third size quartile of their 
industry, and they take over a target that is active in Manufacturing or Construction.  We 
condition throughout on acquirers that experienced below-average employment growth before 
the merger.  Takeovers in this subset (subset 1) lead to very large post-merger employment 
reductions, up to 18 percentage points over the full 4-year period.  In each period the effects 
are more than twice as large as the average effect in the sample.  
[Table 8 about here] 
In the other two subsets, we vary either the type of acquirer or the type of target, but hold 
the features of the other partner in the takeover constant.  Subset 2 shows estimates for large 
acquirers and subset 3 for targets in Trade or Services.  The estimates again show drastically 
different post-merger outcomes when we change an attribute of one of the merging firms.  The 
takeover effects in the two subsets never differ significantly from the sample average, and many 
of the interaction effects even change sign.  This finding is supportive of the theoretical 
prediction in Dutz (1989) if we consider manufacturing firms to be more likely to benefit from 
technology upgrading after a merger, but our estimates also highlight that the theory does not 
hold for acquirers in the top size quartile. 
6. Conclusion 
We evaluated the effects of takeovers or mergers on firm employment growth and obtained 
two novel findings.  First, using a novel way to obtain a comprehensive sample of mergers 
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where firms integrate their workforces, we document that such takeover activity is remarkably 
widespread.  Much of the literature focuses on takeovers by large or listed firms, which is 
understandable as these mergers are most likely to receive competition policy attention.  
However, such an approach will miss to a large extent the important role that takeover activity 
plays in the economy’s growth process.  Second, we find a persistent, negative impact on 
employment on average, but also a wide diversity in merger outcomes.  Previous studies have 
evaluated differences in post-merger performance by conditioning on features of the acquirer, 
for example comparing takeovers by foreign and domestic firms, or the target firm.  In our 
sample, we find little systematic heterogeneity in outcomes when we distinguish mergers along 
individual characteristics of either the acquirer or the target.  We do, however, find such 
heterogeneity when we condition simultaneously on combined characteristics of both partners.  
Even for a specific type of acquirer, post-merger employment growth is found to depend 
crucially on the type of firm it acquires. 
The merger literature has documented a variety of reasons why firms engage in takeovers. 
Realized takeovers, but also subsequent performance are likely to depend on these motivations.  
Expected employment effects are necessarily ambiguous if one averages over a broad sample 
of heterogeneous mergers and this might have contributed to the wide range of conflicting 
estimates in the literature.  We have proposed a simple approach of exact matching to pairs of 
firms as a way of obtaining valid counterfactuals for the merging firms and more specifically 
valid counterfactuals for particular combinations of firms.  Our analysis is limited by the 
available data which necessitated a focus on employment as performance variable.  In a dataset 
with more extensive information on firm characteristics, the same approach could be used to 
evaluate the impact of mergers on other post-merger performance variables, such as 
profitability or output growth, as in Gugler et al. (2003).  Importantly, the empirical approach 
that we propose pairs each takeover with a set of appropriate control firm-pairs.  When 
additional variables are observed, it should be possible to better characterize different types of 
mergers, e.g. distinguish between mergers primarily aimed at increasing market power and 
mergers aimed at combining complementary assets, and estimate separate performance effects 
for either type. 
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Appendix 
A.1  Imputation of employment levels in the case of multiple restructurings 
To estimate the net effect of takeovers on firm employment growth as accurately as possible, 
we reconstruct consistent employment histories up to three years before and three years after 
the takeover year for firms that undergo other changes in firm structure, which can be another 
merger or takeover, or a split-up or divestiture.  This can affect target or acquirer firms engaged 
in a takeover in the pre-takeover period, or the merged entity in the post-takeover period.  
Our approach is to impute employment growth at the firm level by assuming the same 
growth rate for each firm involved in a restructuring event.  More specifically, we first construct 
an aggregate employment level that combines all firms interlinked in a given year between t 
and t+1.  Firm-level employment in t+n with n = {1,..,3} is then imputed by assuming the same 
growth rate for each firm involved in the event as the growth in aggregate event-level 
employment.  The imputation method treats split-offs and consolidations symmetrically and 
preserves the firm size distribution in the sample.  Employment is only imputed for three years 
after the event or up to the occurrence of a second event if this comes earlier.  Beyond that, 
firm observations are excluded from the analysis, since correcting for multiple events involves 
a complex set of interlinked firms and the imputation often becomes less reliable.   
We perform a similar, backward employment imputation for up to three years before a 
takeover if leading up to the takeover of interest either the target or acquirer firms themselves 
originate from an earlier firm restructuring, e.g. from a split-up, divestiture, or merger of other 
firm(s).  More details on the methods for identifying events and imputing employment histories 
is provided in Geurts (2016) and Geurts and Van Biesebroeck (2016).   
A.2  Robustness check using alternative sampling schemes 
We have estimated the effect of takeover activity as the average of the within-cell differences 
between the observed outcomes of the merged firms and the average outcomes of the matched 
pairs.  Counterfactual pairs were composed of all possible combinations two firms that matched 
the acquirer and target characteristics on nine characteristics (with a maximum of 150 
counterfactual targets per cell).  This matching procedure yields an uneven number of 
counterfactual pairs per cell ranging between 1 and 9200.  We addressed this by using weights 
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for each counterfactual that corresponded to the ratio between the number of takeovers and 
counterfactuals in a given cell.  To complement our results, we show in Table A.4 estimates 
based on alternative sampling schemes, were a small number of counterfactuals is randomly 
selected within each cell.   
Panel (a) repeats our base-line results for the full sample of the takeover effect measured 
over n-year periods.  In panel (b) the number of counterfactuals is reduced to a maximum of 
10 times the number of takeovers per cell.  The weights are adapted to this new subsample.  In 
panel (c) we choose exactly 10 matches per takeover and drop cells with less than 10 matches.  
Weights are not required for these estimations.  Panel (d) reports results where we choose 
exactly 30 matches per takeover.  The results of the three panels show that the estimates are 
highly robust to alternative sampling schemes.  Both the coefficient estimates and standard 
errors in all four periods differ only slightly from the base-line results.   
Finally, panel (e) show estimates based on the subsample of takeovers and counterfactuals 
for which we have observations in all four periods.  Takeovers and counterfactuals in 2010 to 
2012 drop out as well as pairs including firms that exit before t+3, counterfactuals that are in 
an event before t+3, or takeovers that are in a second event before t+3.  The takeover effect for 
this subsample is slightly more negative in the first three periods than it is in the full sample, 
but the differences with the base-line results are again very small.   
A.3  Additional Tables 
[Table A.1 about here] 
[Table A.2 about here] 
[Table A.3 about here] 
[Table A.4 about here] 
[Table A.5 about here] 
 
  
 
33 
 
 
References  
Anderson, D.W., L. Kish, and R.G. Cornell (1980). “On stratification, grouping and matching.” 
Scandinavian Journal of Statistics 7(2): 61–66. 
Bandick, R. and H. Görg (2010). “Foreign acquisition, plant survival, and employment 
growth.” Canadian Journal of Economics 43(2): 547–573. 
Brown, C. and J.L. Medoff (1988). “The impact of firm acquisitions on labor.” In A.J. Auerbach 
(ed.), Corporate takeovers: Causes and consequences. University of Chicago Press. 
Burghardt, D. and M. Helm (2015). “Firm growth in the course of mergers and acquisitions.” 
Small Business Economics 44(4): 889–904. 
Chung, S., H. Singh, and K. Lee (2000). “Complementarity, status similarity and social capital 
as drivers of alliance formation.” Strategic Management Journal 21(1): 1–22. 
Conyon, M.J., S. Girma, S. Thompson, and P.W. Wright (2002). “The impact of mergers and 
acquisitions on company employment in the United Kingdom.” European Economic Review 
46(1): 31–49. 
Davis, S.J., J.C. Haltiwanger, and S. Schuh (1996a). Job creation and destruction. MIT Press. 
Dutz, M.A. (1989). “Horizontal mergers in declining industries: Theory and evidence.” 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 7(1): 11–33. 
Furlan, B. (2015). “Acquire and fire? Evidence from European mergers.” University of 
Salzburg Working Paper No. 2015-03. 
Geurts, K. (2016). “Longitudinal firm-level data: Problems and solutions.” Small Business 
Economics 46(3): 425–445. 
Geurts, K. and J. Van Biesebroeck (2016). “Firm creation and post-entry dynamics of de novo 
entrants.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 49: 59–104. 
Girma, S. and H. Görg (2004). “Blessing or curse? Domestic plants' survival and employment 
prospects after foreign acquisitions.” Applied Economics Quarterly 50(1): 89–110. 
Gugler, K., D.C. Mueller, B.B. Yurtoglu, and C. Zulehner (2003). “The effects of mergers:  An 
international comparison.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 21(5): 625–653. 
Gugler, K. and B. Yurtoglu (2004). “The effects of mergers on company employment in the 
USA and Europe.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 22(4): 481–502. 
Iacus, S.M., G. King, and G. Porro (2012). “Causal inference without balance checking: 
Coarsened exact matching.” Political Analysis 20(1): 1–24. 
Imbens, G.W. (2004). “Nonparametric estimation of average treatment effects under 
exogeneity: A review.” Review of Economics and Statistics 86(1): 4–29. 
  
 
34 
 
 
Imbens, G.W. and J.M. Wooldridge (2009). “Recent developments in the econometrics of 
program evaluation.” Journal of Economic Literature 47(1): 5–86. 
Jarrell, G.A., J.A. Brickley, and J.M. Netter (1988). “The market for corporate control: The 
empirical evidence since 1980.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2(1): 49–68. 
Jensen, M.C. (1988). “Takeovers: Their causes and consequences.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 2(1): 21–48. 
Kalnins, A., L. Froeb, and S. Tschantz (2017). “Can mergers increase output? Evidence from 
the lodging industry.” RAND Journal of Economics 48(1): 178–202. 
Lafontaine, F. and M. Slade (2007). “Vertical integration and firm boundaries: The evidence.” 
Journal of Economic Literature, 45(3): 629–685. 
Lehto, E. and P. Böckerman (2008). “Analysing the employment effects of mergers and 
acquisitions.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 68(1): 112–124. 
McGuckin, R.H. and S.V. Nguyen (2001). “The impact of ownership changes: A view from 
labor markets.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 19(5): 739–762. 
Mindruta, D., M. Moeen, and R. Agarwal (2015). “A two-sided matching approach for partner 
selection and assessing complementarities in partners' attributes in inter-firm alliances.” 
Strategic Management Journal 37(1): 206–231. 
Röller, L.-H., J. Stennek, and F. Verboven (2001). “Efficiency gains from mergers.” European 
Economy 5, 31-127. 
Shleifer, A. and L.H. Summers (1988). “Breach of trust in hostile takeovers.” In A.J. Auerbach 
(ed.), Corporate takeovers: Causes and consequences. University of Chicago Press. 
Stiebale, J. and M. Trax (2011). “The effects of cross-border M&As on the acquirers’ domestic 
performance: firm-level evidence.” Canadian Journal of Economics 44(3): 957–990. 
Sutton, J. (1997). “Gibrat's legacy.” Journal of Economic Literature 35(1): 40–59. 
Figure 1.  Frequency of takeovers in the full sample
Notes: Panels (a) and (b) report average annual shares, comparing the sum of acquirers and targets to all active firms in 
a given year that satisfy the preconditions of a target (at least two employees and at least one year old). The share in 
Panel (c) is calculated as the average annual employment of all firms involved in a takeover at least once in a 5-year 
period, divided by the corresponding value for all active firms that satisfy the preconditions of a target.
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
0% 3% 6% 9% 12% 15% 18%
(bottom scale)
(c) Share in employment over 5-year period:
by merger source
by partner type
(b) Annual share in employment (top scale):
by merger source
by partner type
(a) Annual share in population (top scale):
All Acquirers Targets
Commercial Court only Both Employee-flows only
by partner type:
by merger source:
Figure 2.  Takeover frequency by sector
(a) Annual shares
(b) Number of firms
Notes: Panel (a) reports average annual shares, based on the sum of acquirers and targets to all active firms in a 
given sector and year that satisfy the preconditions of a target (at least two employees and at least one year old). 
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Dependent variable: cumulative employment growth from t-1 to t+1
Notes: Subsets are defined by the interaction of 7 dummy variables, i.e. the binary matching 
variables. Only estimates for subsets with at least 10 takeovers are included, which amounts to 71 
subsets. The takeover effect (β+δ ) is estimated for each subset using equation (4) and the 
histogram is shown. The black areas of the bars indicate subsets for which the takeover effect 
significantly differs (at the 10 percent level) from the average effect among takeovers not in the 
same subset. The vertical line shows the average employment effect estimated using all takeovers. 
Figure 3.  Distribution of estimated takeover effects for detailed subsets
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Table 1.  Characteristics of acquirers, targets and non-merging firms
Number of firm-year observations 2601 3400 808,662
Size (t -1)
Mean (st. dev.) 189 (704) 31 (103) 17 (212)
Median 45 12 4
Pre-merger growth rate (t -3 to t -1)
a
Mean (st. dev.) .046 (.273) .089 (.649) .227 (.614)
Median .010 .000 .000
Share of firms
part of enterprise group (t -1 or t -2) (%) 51.7 41.5 9.6
engaged in FDI (t -2) (%) 11.5 6.7 1.1
Age distribution (t -1)
b
5 years old or younger (%) 1.2 5.5 18.2
more than 5 years old (%) 77.3 83.8 75.6
in event in 5-year period before takeover (%) 21.5 10.7 6.1
Acquirers Targets
Non-merging 
firms
Notes: Statistics are based on the full sample of takeovers between 2005 and 2012 that satisfy in t -1 the preconditions of 
acquirers (at least 4 years old and 10 employees), targets (at least one year old and 2 employees), and target share (at least 
1%).  Statistics for non-merging firms are based on all firms in 2006-2012 that satisfy in t -1 the preconditions of targets.
a
 Populations of targets and non-merging firms include entrants in t -3 to t -2.  Excluding entrants, growth rates are -0.045 
and 0.095, respectively.
b
 Based on observations in 2008-2012.
Table 2.  Combined characteristics of acquirers and targets 
(a) Acquirer and target pre-merger size (t -1)
Mean Mean 
Acquirer size Target size Target size Acquirer size
Acquirer                      
size quartile
Target                           
size quartile
Q1 15 7 Q1 4 54
Q2 31 13 Q2 8 71
Q3 77 21 Q3 17 119
Q4 632 63 Q4 75 507
(b) Acquirer and target pre-merger growth (t -3 to t -1)
Mean Mean 
Acquirer growth Target growth Target growth Acquirer growth
Acquirer 
growth quartile
Target                             
growth quartile
Q1 -.227 .069 Q1 -.547 .034
Q2 -.029 .039 Q2 -.121 .019
Q3 .072 .080 Q3 .036 .050
Q4 .366 .122 Q4 .481 .069
Entrants 2.000 .096
Table 3.  Which firms select into becoming an acquirer or target?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm-level variables
Size (log employment in t -1) 1.498 *** 1.386 *** 1.599 *** 1.543 ***
(.101) (.107) (.069) (.071)
Size² (log employment in t -1) -.083 *** -.067 *** -.180 *** -.177 ***
(.011) (.012) (.011) (.012)
Pre-merger growth rate (t -3 to t -1) -.406 *** -.369 *** -1.107 *** -1.095 ***
(.094) (.096) (.065) (.065)
Part of enterprise group 1.034 *** 1.051 *** 1.282 *** 1.228 ***
  (t -2 or t -1, dummy) (.045) (.046) (.046) (.046)
FDI (t -2, dummy) -.162 ** -.193 ** .198 ** .080 *
(.077) (.082) (.093) (.098)
Industry variables
Declining industry -.060 -.109 *
  (t -3 to t -1, dummy) (.059) (.060)
Knowledge intensive sector .164 * .480 ***
  (dummy) (.090) (.088)
Industry concentration ratio -.710 *** .286 **
  (t -1) (.135) (.130)
Increasing industry concentration -.479 1.376 *
  (t -3 to t -1, dummy) (.866) (.810)
Sector FE (9 classes) yes yes
Nace 3-digit FE (166 classes) yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R-squared .122 .147 .121 .143
No. of observations 166,367 147,089 719,577 638,972
Notes: Coefficient estimates from logistic regressions.  Results are based on the sample of takeovers and non-merging 
firms in 2005-2012, which in columns (1) and (2) satisfy the preconditions of an acquirer in t -1 (at least 4 years old and 
10 employees) and in columns (3) and (4) the preconditions of a target (at least 1 year old and 2 employees).  Acquirers 
and targets are identified either using Commercial Court records or using the employee-flow method.   Standard errors 
in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level.
Dependent variable is a dummy for ...
Target firm in period t -1 to tAcquiring firm in period t -1 to t
Table 4.  Characteristics of acquirers, targets and control firms before and after matching
Takeovers Control 
group
Difference Takeovers
b Control 
group
c
Difference 
A B |A-B| C D |C-D|
Number of firm-year observations
Acquirers 2,517 164,877 2,209 1,734,611
Targets 3,305 724,870 2,969 1,734,611
1,2.  Number of acquirers per year and (acquirer) industry
Mean 3.4 140.2 -136.9 3.6 3.6 0.0
1,3.  Number of targets per year and (target) industry
Mean 3.4 613.5 -610.1 3.6 3.6 0.0
4.  Acquirer part of enterprise group (t -1 or t -2)
Share 47% 19% 28% 49% 49% 0%
5.  Target part of enterprise group (t -1 or t -2)
Share 38% 8% 29% 39% 39% 0%
6.  Acquirer size (t -1)
Mean 194 39 154 165 68 97
Median [46] [18] [28] [45] [37] [8]
7.  Target size (t -1)
Mean 41 12 29 33 14 19
Median [13] [4] [9] [13] [9] [4]
8.  Acquirer pre-merger growth rate
d
 (t -3 to t -1)
Mean .043 .081 .037 .048 .060 .011
Median [.009] [.047] [.037] [.014] [.029] [.015]
9.  Target pre-merger growth rate (t -3 to t -1)
Mean -.005 .200 .205 -.011 .025 .036
Median [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000]
Pre-matching
a Post-matching
Notes: 
a
 Pre-matching statistics are based on the sample of takeovers and control (non-merging) firms in 2005-2012 that satisfy 
in t -1 the preconditions of acquirers or targets.
b
 Post-matching: takeovers without consistent employment information in each of the three years before the merger, and 
takeovers with an acquirer or target for which no valid matches could be found are excluded.  For takeovers with 
multiple targets, target size and pre-merger growth are based on the sum of targets.
c
 Post-matching: control group consists of pairs of firms that match the target and acquirer characteristics.  Reported 
results are based on weighted averages.
d
 Target pre-merger growth rates include entrants with growth rate equal to +2.
Table 5.  Effect of takeovers on post-merger employment growth 
(a) Year-on-year employment growth
Dependent variable: employment growth rate
1st 2nd 3rd
(t -1 to t ) (t  to t +1) (t +1 to t +2) (t +2 to t +3)
Takeover effect -.023 *** -.024 *** -.028 *** -.015 **
(.003) (.006) (.007) (.008)
No. of observations 1,736,820 1,421,809 1,149,918 871,464
No. of takeovers 2,209 1,927 1,562 1,132
(b) Cumulative employment growth over n -year periods 
Dependent variable: employment growth rate
Takeover period 2-year period 3-year period 4-year period
(t -1 to t ) (t -1 to t +1) (t -1 to t +2) (t -1 to t +3)
Takeover effect -.023 *** -.046 *** -.070 *** -.083 ***
(.003) (.007) (.010) (.014)
No. of observations 1,736,820 1,421,809 1,150,387 873,052
No. of takeovers 2,209 1,927 1,572 1,157
(c) Growth acceleration
Dependent variable: difference in employment growth rate pre- and post-merger
Takeover effect -.008 ** ***
(.004)
No. of observations
No. of takeovers
Takeover 
period
n th post-merger period
Notes: Regression coefficients show the average treatment effect on the treated using exact matching on acquirer and 
target characteristics.  Takeovers in 2005-2012.  Observations are dropped when employment is outside the sample 
period.  Regressions include all firms active at the start of a period, both survivors and exiting firms.  Standard errors in 
parentheses; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level. 
difference in 1-year growth rates difference in 2-year growth rates
(t -1 to t ) - (t -2 to t -1) (t -1 to t +1) - (t -3 to t -1)
1,736,820
2,209
-.030
(.007)
1,392,537
1,863
Table 6.  Differential effect of takeovers by single firm or industry characteristics
Dependent variable: cumulative employment growth rate
Matching variables (all binary)
Vertical merger .005 (.006) .013 (.014) -.020 (.021) -.007 (.029)
Acquirer high pre-merger growth
a
.017 *** (.006) .019 (.013) .009 (.021) .011 (.029)
Target high pre-merger growth
a
.015 ** (.006) .021 (.013) .023 (.021) .035 (.029)
Acquirer part of enterprise group .000 (.006) .028 ** (.013) .030 (.020) .033 (.028)
Target part of enterprise group .001 (.006) .022 * (.013) .028 (.020) .012 (.029)
Acquirer in largest size quartile .006 (.007) .027 * (.015) .021 (.022) .040 (.031)
Target share < 25% .007 (.006) .030 ** (.014) .023 (.021) .051 * (.029)
Other firm-level variables
Acquirer invests in FDI -.005 (.008) .004 (.015) -.007 (.027) .042 (.033)
Target invests in FDI -.005 (.012) .023 (.024) .040 (.038) .071 * (.040)
Industry variables
Acquirer in Manufacturing .000 (.007) .000 (.017) -.013 (.026) -.060 * (.036)
Target in Manufacturing -.006 (.008) -.006 (.018) -.018 (.028) -.055 (.041)
Acquirer in Trade or Services .004 (.006) .029 ** (.014) .062 *** (.021) .098 *** (.030)
Target in Trade or Services .001 (.006) .022 (.014) .057 ** (.022) .086 *** (.031)
Acquirer  in declining industry .007 (.006) .016 (.014) .023 (.023) -.021 (.040)
Target in declining industry .008 (.006) .010 (.014) .008 (.023) -.036 (.040)
Acquirer in concentrated industry .005 (.011) .023 (.024) .032 (.041) -.025 (.051)
Target industry is concentrating -.007 (.020) .005 (.035) -.073 (.096) -.035 (.124)
Target in high-tech industry -.010 (.011) .002 (.025) .013 (.036) -.015 (.052)
Years with takeover effect significantly different from average
b
t = 2007 .729 * (.042)
t = 2011 .025 ** (.011)
Notes: Regression coefficients show the average treatment effect on the treated using exact matching on acquirer and target 
characteristics for takeovers in 2005-2012.  Each coefficient is estimated using a separate regression like equation (4), where 
the subset dummy is defined by a single characteristic. The table reports the δ coefficient of the interaction term between the 
takeover and subset dummies. The binary firm-level variables are always defined to yield a positive employment effect.  
Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level. 
a
 High growth means above the sample average
b
 We estimated regressions for takeovers in all 7 years in the sample and all 4 time periods and only report the coefficients 
that are statistically different from zero.
4-year period
(t -1 to t +3)(t -1 to t ) (t -1 to t +1) (t -1 to t +2)
Takeover period 2-year period 3-year period
Dependent variable: cumulative employment growth rate
Takeover period 2-year period 3-year period 4-year period
(t -1 to t ) (t -1 to t +1) (t -1 to t +2) (t -1 to t +3)
(a) Sample: all firms
Main takeover effect (β) -.026 *** -.051 *** -.076 *** -.089 ***
(.003) (.007) (.010) (.015)
Takeover effect in subset (β+δ) .006 .011 .013 .079 *
(.010) (.018) (.029) (.042)
Difference in effects (δ) .032 *** .062 *** .089 *** .168 ***
(.011) (.020) (.031) (.045)
Difference in effects (δ) -.010 .009 -.016 -.054
(.009) (.017) (.040) (.080)
Difference in effects (δ) -.001 .007 .022 .030
(.007) (.014) (.023) (.032)
Number of observations 1,736,820 1,421,809 1,150,387 873,052
Takeovers in subset 1 171 164 104 41
Takeovers in subset 2 198 186 104 40
Takeovers in subset 3 373 300 273 231
(b) Sample: only takeovers with large target shares
Subset 1 difference in effects (δ) .047 ** .074 ** .099 ** .229 ***
(.019) (.030) (.044) (.082)
Subset 2 difference in effects (δ) -.016 .012 -.003 -.052
(.016) (.032) (.057) (.135)
(c) Sample: only horizontal mergers
Subset 1 difference in effects (δ) .036 ** .050 ** .061 * .167 **
(.015) (.024) (.037) (.074)
Subset 2 difference in effects (δ) -.009 -.003 -.004 -.035
(.011) (.021) (.043) (.087)
Subset 1:  Acquirer in declining industry
a
  &  Target with high pre-merger growth
Subset 2:  Acquirer in declining industry
a
  &  Target with low pre-merger growth
Subset 3:  Acquirer in growing industry
a
  &  Target with high pre-merger growth
Table 7.  Employment expansions for one type of takeovers: 
Acquirers in declining industries and high-growth targets
Notes: Regression coefficients show the average treatment effect on the treated using exact matching on acquirer and 
target characteristics.  Takeovers in 2005-2012.  Results are based on equation (4), where the subset dummy is defined by 
the combined characteristics. The main takeover effect β represents the employment effect among all other pairs of firms 
not included in the subsets. The interaction effect δ represents the differential effect for the subset. Finally, β+δ represents 
the main effect within the subset. Its standard error is obtained by an estimation of the same equation where we reversed 
the subset dummies. Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level. 
a
 We condition all subsets on acquirers being part of enterprise group
Dependent variable: cumulative employment growth rate
Takeover period 2-year period 3-year period 4-year period
(t -1 to t ) (t -1 to t +1) (t -1 to t +2) (t -1 to t +3)
Main takeover effect (β) -.022 *** -.039 *** -.064 *** -.074 ***
(.003) (.007) (.010) (.017)
Takeover effect in subset (β+δ) -.046 *** -.124 *** -.139 *** -.180 ***
(.013) (.035) (.043) (.061)
Difference in effects (δ) -.024 * -.084 ** -.075 * -.106 *
(.013) (.036) (.044) (.062)
Difference in effects (δ) -.001 .033 ** .021 .058
(.008) (.015) (.030) (.040)
Difference in effects (δ) -.019 * -.014 .010 .016
(.010) (.022) (.034) (.048)
Number of observations 1,736,820 1,421,809 1,150,387 873,052
Takeovers in subset 1 167 151 120 97
Takeovers in subset 2 254 214 180 137
Takeovers in subset 3 278 246 206 151
Notes: Note: Regression coefficients show the average treatment effect on the treated using exact matching on acquirer 
and target characteristics.  Takeovers in 2005-2012.  Results are based on equation (4), where the subset dummy is 
defined by the combined characteristics. The main takeover effect β represents the employment effect among all other 
pairs of firms not included in the subsets. The interaction effect δ represents the differential effect for the subset. Finally, 
β+δ represents the main effect within the subset. Its standard error is obtained by an estimation of the same equation 
where we reversed the subset dummies. Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
or 1% level. 
a
 We condition all subsets on acquirers experiencing below-average growth before the merger.
Table 8.  Stronger employment reductions for one type of takeovers: 
Small acquirers and targets in manufacturing or construction
Subset 1:  Acquirer of below-average size
a
  &  Target in manufacturing or construction
(a) Sample: all firms
Subset 2:  Acquirer of above-average size
a
  &  Target in manufacturing or construction
Subset 3:  Acquirer of below-average size
a
  &  Target in trade or services
Table A.1  Description of the variables
Description
Size in t -1 The number of employees a firm employs at the last point of 
observation before the takeover, i.e. at June 30 of year t -1. 
Pre-merger growth rate (t -3 to t -1) The employment growth rate in the 2-year period before the takeover: 
Firm is part of an enterprise group 
(dummy)
Takes a value of one if firm i owns at least 50 percent of the shares of 
another Belgian firm or is owned by another Belgian firm for at least 
50 percent in t -1 or t -2.
FDI (dummy) Takes a value of one if firm i  is either receiver or sender of FDI in t -2.
Declining industry (dummy) Takes a value of one if the industry at the Nace 2‑digit level exhibited 
negative output growth between t -3 and t -1.
Knowledge intensive industry 
(dummy)
Takes a value of one if the industry at the Nace 2‑digit level is high-
tech  manufacturing industry or a knowledge-intensive service 
industry (source: Eurostat, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/DE/htec_esms.htm)Industry concentration ratio Employment share of the four largest firms at the Nace 3-digit 
industry level (166 industries) in t -1.
Increasing industry concentration 
(dummy)
Takes a value of one if the industry concentration ratio increases from 
t -3 to t .
Nace 3-digit level 166 industries
Nace 2-digit level 76 industries
Sector groups 9 groups: Agriculture; Manufacturing; Energy; Construction; Trade; 
Transportation; Accommodation; Business services; Other services.
Explanatory variables
Firm-level variables
Industry variables
Industry classifications
𝑔𝑖 = Τ𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐸𝑖𝑡−3 ഥ𝐸𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ ഥ𝐸𝑖 = Τ𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡−3 2
Table A.2  Share of firms involved in a restructuring event
Number of obs.
(t ) (t  to t +1) (t  to t +2) (t  to t +3)
Takeovers 2,259 .14 .25 .34
Firms in control sample 128 025 .02 .03 .05
Share in event
Table A.3  Which firms select into acquirer or target: identified using different methods?
Takeovers are identified by…
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size (log employment in t -1) 1.527 *** 1.252 *** 1.157 *** 2.385 ***
(.141) (.156) (.085) (.139)
Size² (log employment in t -1) -.086 *** -.054 *** -.118 *** -.319 ***
(.015) (.017) (.013) (.024)
Pre-merger growth rate (t -3 to t -1) -.333 *** -.399 *** -1.310 *** -.804 ***
(.126) (.145) (.087) (.096)
Part of enterprise group 1.345 *** .623 *** 1.463 *** .888 ***
  (t -2 or t -1, dummy) (.061) (.070) (.061) (.073)
FDI (t -2, dummy) -.238 ** -.168 .195 * -.209
(.102) (.131) (.117) (.182)
Nace 3-digit FE (166 classes) yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R-squared .167 .111 .143 .121
No. of observations 125,682 125,849 548,722 546,297
Notes: Coefficient estimates from logistic regressions.  Results are based on the sample of takeovers and non-merging 
firms in 2005-2012, which in columns (1) and (2) satisfy the preconditions of an acquirer in t-1 (at least 4 years old and 
10 employees) and in columns (3) and (4) the preconditions of a target (at least 1 year old and 2 employees).  Standard 
errors in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level.
Dependent variable is a dummy for ...
Acquiring firm in period t -1 to t Target firm in period t -1 to t
Commercial 
Court
Employee-
flows only
Commercial 
Court
Employee-
flows only
Dependent variable: cumulative employment growth rate 
Takeover period 2-year period 3-year period 4-year period
(t -1 to t ) (t -1 to t +1) (t -1 to t +2) (t -1 to t +3)
(a) Full sample
Takeover effect -.023*** -.046*** -.070*** -.083***
(.003) (.007) (.010) (.014)
No. of observations 1,736,820 1,421,809 1,150,387 873,052
No. of takeovers 2,209 1,927 1,572 1,157
(b) Subsample with max 10 controls per takeover
Takeover effect -.023*** -.047*** -.069*** -.084***
(.003) (.007) (.010) (.015)
No. of observations 23,271 20,242 16,524 12,199
No. of takeovers 2,209 1,927 1,572 1,157
(c) Subsample with exact 10 controls per takeover
Takeover effect -.024*** -.046*** -.069*** -.075***
(.003) (.007) (.011) (.015)
No. of observations 21,978 19,052 15,552 11,522
No. of takeovers 1,998 1,732 1,412 1,042
(d) Subsample with exact 30 controls per takeover
Takeover effect -.022*** -.044*** -.072*** -.080***
(.003) (.008) (.012) (.016)
No. of observations 55,521 48,050 39,246 28,861
No. of takeovers 1,791 1,550 1,266 931
(e) Subsample using only firms that survive to the end of the period (t+3)
Takeover effect -.027*** -.055*** -.074*** -.083***
(.004) (.009) (.012) (.014)
No. of observations 873,052 873,052 873,052 873,052
No. of takeovers 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157
Table A.4  Robustness check for the effect of takeovers on employment growth: 
Alternative sampling schemes for the number of controls 
Notes:  The results in panel (a) replicate the results of Table 5 panel (b) and serve as benchmark.
Dependent variable: cumulative employment growth rate 
Takeover period 2-year period 3-year period 4-year period
(t -1 to t ) (t -1 to t +1) (t -1 to t +2) (t -1 to t +3)
(a) Exact matching
Takeover effect -.022*** -.044*** -.072*** -.080***
(.003) (.008) (.012) (.016)
No. of observations 55,521 48,050 39,246 28,861
No. of takeovers 1,791 1,550 1,266 931
(b) Propensity score matching
Takeover effect -.021*** -.039*** -.070*** -.063***
(.004) (.008) (.012) (.017)
No. of observations 54,963 47,492 38,688 28,520
No. of takeovers 1,773 1,532 1,248 920
(c) Inverse probability-weighted regression adjustment
Takeover effect -.021*** -.041*** -.064*** -.070***
(.003) (.007) (.011) (.015)
No. of observations 54,963 47,492 38,688 28,520
No. of takeovers 1,773 1,532 1,248 920
Notes:  All estimates are based on a subsample with exactly 30 control observations per takeover.  The results in panel (a) 
replicate the results from Table A.4 panel (d), and serve as a benchmark. The matching estimators in panel (b) and (c) 
will not necessarily use the same controls for each takeover as the ones we selected for exact matching.  For the 
estimations in panel (b), we impose that each firm involved in a takeover should be matched with at least five similar 
firms, the so-called ‘nearest neighbors’; in addition, we impose that the maximum distance for which two observations are 
potential neighbors is 0.05 standard deviation of the propensity scores.  These restrictions slightly reduce the number of 
observations. We use exactly the same observations for the estimations in panel (c).
Table A.5  Robustness check for the effect of takeovers on employment growth: 
Alternative treatment effect estimators (within cells)
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